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Abstract 
In the first phase of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS), the price per ton of CO2 
initially rose to over €30; the price then collapsed to essentially zero by mid 2007. By deriving a 
structural model of the allowance price under the assumption of efficient markets I examine the 
extent to which this variation in price can be explained by marginal abatement costs. I then 
gradually relax the model by allowing for delayed adjustment of price to fundamentals, as well as 
by introducing lagged LHS variables. The pattern of the results suggests that while prices were not 
initially driven by marginal abatement costs, this inefficiency was largely corrected after the 
accounting of 2005 emissions in April 2006.   
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1.  Introduction 
The allowance price per ton of carbon dioxide (CO2) in the first phase of the European Union 
Emissions Trading Scheme (EU ETS) caught many observers by surprise. It started at around €5 
but quickly increased to a range of €20-30 where it remained for over a year.  The price crashed 
after realized 2005 emissions were made public that showed the market to be over-allocated, but it 
recovered somewhat and remained at around €15 for another few months, before starting a gradual 
decline.  By mid 2007, an allowance was virtually worthless.  
Market analysts and economists alike have been looking for reasons behind the peculiar 
allowance price movement.  Some have pointed to market fundamentals such as fuel prices and the 
weather [1, 2, 3, 4] but others have found no such correlation and confined themselves to 
forecasting based on pure time-series approaches [5, 6].  Whereas the April 2006 crash can be 
explained by the lower-than-expected overall emissions reports, it is not clear what drove the 
allowance price to those heights in the first place.  Knowledge of aggregate emissions and 
abatement is not necessary for the efficiency of a permit market, since this information is supposed 
to be implicit in the market-clearing allowance price.   
In this paper I examine if and to what extent the allowance price in the first phase of the EU 
ETS was based on market fundamentals related to aggregate abatement.  I set up an economic 
model that specifies allowance price changes as a function of a set of widely accepted price drivers 
(fuel prices, temperature, reservoir levels, economic indicators and announcements of verified 
emissions), under the assumption of efficient markets and using the best data available.  I then 
relax this model by introducing nonlinear terms, lagged fundamentals and lagged price changes 
and gauge their importance relative to the fundamentals.   
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The results differ for the periods before and after the price adjustment.  For the period after the 
crash, I find that a model in which fundamentals enter nonlinearly and that allows for gradual 
adjustment of the allowance price to fuel price changes is able to explain a large portion of the 
observed allowance price variation.  In addition, many of the coefficients on the fundamentals are 
significant and have the expected sign.  Introducing lagged allowance price changes improves the 
model only marginally, and the fundamentals retain their explanatory power.   
For the pre-crash period, the model does not perform as well, even when allowing for 
nonlinear effects and gradual adjustment to fuel prices.  Once introduced to the model, lagged price 
changes are the main price determinants, which may be a useful result for forecasting but certainly 
not for the identification of allowance price drivers.  My results imply that the allowance price was 
not driven by marginal abatement cost determinants (with the possible exception of gas prices) 
before the first round of emissions accounting in April 2006, thus violating a necessary condition 
for a permit market to be an efficient policy instrument.  Perhaps more importantly, they indicate 
that the market eventually corrected itself.  However, the apparently inflated allowance price 
during the first 16 months of the market may have lead to over-abatement [7] and was passed 
through to output prices of the covered sectors [8, 9].   
This paper makes two contributions:  First, the stepwise procedure of starting with economic 
theory and then gradually introducing more flexibility allows insights into the determinants of the 
EU ETS allowance price that go beyond existing analyses.  Second, I use a dataset of daily weather 
measurements in dozens of monitoring stations across Europe reaching back over three decades.  
No dataset of comparable quality has been used in the literature to address the influence of weather 
shocks on the allowance price.   
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2.  The EU ETS 
The EU ETS is the world’s largest emissions permit market to date and covers almost half of 
the EU’s total CO2 emissions. The first phase of the market spanned the years 2005-2007 and was 
considered a pilot run for the second phase, which coincides with the Kyoto compliance period of 
2008-2012.  Pilot phase allowances (one-time rights to emit one ton of CO2) could not be banked 
into the second phase and lost their value if unused for compliance.  The market applies to all EU 
countries, covers CO2 emissions from nine industry sectors defined by “activity code”1
Firms can trade allowances freely within the EU, either bilaterally, through brokers (over-the-
counter or OTC trades) or on one of six exchanges.  By April 30 of each year, they have to 
surrender permits corresponding to their emissions in the previous calendar year.  This is also the 
date where each installation’s realized and externally verified emissions from the previous calendar 
year are made public by each EU country.  There is a penalty for noncompliance of €40 in phase 1 
and €100 in phase 2 for every ton of emitted CO2 for which firms do not surrender an allowance; in 
addition, they have to surrender the missing allowances in the following year.  
 and allows 
for opt-ins from other sectors.  In the first phase, about 11,000 individual installations received a 
total of 2,100 million emission allowances (EUAs) annually, mostly at no cost.  For a more 
detailed discussion of the market setup, see [10] and [11].   
Because firms receive annual allowances in March of every year, they can effectively bank 
and borrow across time within phase 1.  However, neither banking into nor borrowing from phase 
2 is allowed, making phase 1 a self-contained market that is not related to future caps and political 
decisions regarding Kyoto.  Banking from the second into later phases is permitted.   
Allowance distribution and actual emissions by sector are shown in Figure 1.  Power & heat 
received nearly 70% of the total allocation and is responsible for 72 % of aggregate emissions 
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covered by the market.2
 
  This was the only sector with a net shortage of allowances, whereas all 
other sectors acted as net allowance suppliers.  About 84 % of the covered installations are 
relatively small with <0.1 million tons (Mt) of CO2 emissions per year, and together they emit only 
about 8% of total emissions.  At the other end of the spectrum, the top one percent of the 
installations together account for almost 40 % of emissions.  Most of these large emitters are power 
plants.   
Figure 1: Allowance allocation and emissions by sector for 2006 (activity codes in parenthesis) 
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Allowance price realizations during the first phase of the EU ETS defied pre-market 
expectations.  Because the emissions cap for the pilot phase was set rather generously, prices were 
generally predicted to be low.3 The actual daily allowance price and trading volumes are presented 
in Figure 2.  The price increased from around €7 in January 2005 to above €30 in April 2006, 
before crashing to below €10 within three days.  It then rose again and stabilized above €15 for 
about four months before decreasing to practically zero by mid 2007.  The April price crash was 
triggered by the first round of emissions accounting (termed “emissions verification” in the EU 
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ETS), which revealed that verified 2005 emissions were 94 Mt below the cap.4
 
  The second round 
of emissions verifications in May 2007 again found the market to be long, but this no longer had a 
significant impact since prices had decreased to a few cents.  Emissions verifications for 2007 
occurred after the end of the phase 1.  Liquidity was overall high, and a significant amount of the 
total allocation had been traded even in the first year.  Table 1 shows a summary of the first phase.   
Figure 2: EUA price and trading volumes 
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The fact that aggregate emissions in all three years were below the total allocation for those 
years is either due to over-abatement or over-allocation.  Without the possibility of banking, 
abating more than necessary in the first period and using the freed-up allowances for compliance in 
later periods with a tighter cap is not an option.  A preliminary analysis [7] implies that at least a 
part of the gap between emissions and allocation was due to abatement.  The over-allocation was 
most likely not intentional but brought on by the fact that the EU did not have reliable information 
about firms’ actual emissions before the market started and largely defined allocations based on 
industry projections, with obvious incentive problems.   
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3.  Allowance market model 
3.1  Literature 
There is a large volume of empirical work on the SO2 permit trading system in the USA, e.g. 
[13, 14, 15, 16, 17] and more recently [18, 19], to name only a few.  For the EU ETS, the empirical 
literature is scarcer because it is a much newer market, and because fewer data are available in 
general since the involved firms previously faced little regulation.  A number of studies model the 
EUA price and its volatility mainly for risk management and forecasting purposes [6, 20, 21, 22].  
While useful for companies that need to hedge against the risk embedded in carbon prices, they do 
not shed much light on fundamental price drivers.   
I am aware of four papers that explicitly aim to determine the impact of market fundamentals:  
Bunn and Fezzi [1] use a cointegrated VAR model with allowances, electricity and gas in the UK 
and daily temperature in London as an exogenous variable and impose the necessary identifying 
restrictions using auxiliary regressions.  They find that the UK gas price influences the EUA price, 
and that both gas and EUA prices help determine the electricity price.   
Mansanet-Batallet et al. [3] focused on EU-wide fuel prices and a weather index comprising 
several cities. They focus on the first year of the market only and include dummies for the six 
largest price changes, which end up accounting for most of the explanatory power of their model.  
This sidesteps the question of what actually drives the allowance price.  In addition, they include 
regressors that are not obviously related to allowance prices, such as the oil price.5
Alberola et al. [4] use temperatures in capital cities of six EU countries, along with a number 
of EU-wide energy variables, and extend the analysis to the first two years of the market.  
  They find that 
oil prices, natural gas prices and temperature in Germany are the only significant allowance price 
drivers, whereas other determinants turn out to be uncorrelated.   
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Unfortunately, they treat highly endogenous variables such as electricity prices, clean dark and 
clean spark spreads as exogenous determinants of the allowance price.  This is no problem for 
forecasting, but endogeneity can lead to biased coefficient estimates of the price drivers.  
Rickels et al. [2] build on [3], and include data through 2006.  They separate allowance price 
determinants into supply and demand side and carefully choose the included market fundamentals.  
However, although they check for cointegration between allowance and fuel prices (they find 
none) and thus implicitly acknowledge the presence of unit roots in the price data, they specify 
their model in levels as opposed to differences (or returns) to render the data stationary.  A 
nonstationary error is problematic because it may lead to biased coefficient estimates and results 
that are sensitive to the specific portion of the time series examined.   
All four studies are valuable contributions to finding allowance price determinants, but in my 
view, none are based on a convincing market model.  The inclusion/exclusion of market 
fundamentals as well as the econometric specification is mostly ad-hoc, which leads to the 
aforementioned problems.  They also do not take into account the no-banking provision from the 
first into the second phase, and they include lagged EUA prices from the outset without discussing 
the economic meaning of this.  In the following I set up a simple economic model of the allowance 
price and gradually extend it in order to address some of these issues.   
3.2  Base model 
In order to incorporate the uncertainty inherent in the demand and supply of allowances as 
well as the fixed time horizon of the first market phase, I extend a model proposed by Maeda [24].  
Let the time index = 1,…, τ  refer to days, where τ  corresponds to the end of the first phase of the 
EU ETS.  BAUit denote firm i’s random business-as-usual emissions (referring to emissions in the 
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absence of a carbon cost) in period t, which are a function of a vector of normally distributed risk 
factors Ψ shared by all N firms in the market:   
(1) 
( )
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1 1( ) [ ( )] * [ ]
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Firm i’s BAU emissions in the current period are the sum of expected emissions and an 
adjustment term that is a function of shocks to Ψt which contains exogenous variables that 
influence either demand or supply of emissions.  Abatement is defined as the difference between 
firm i’s BAU emissions and actual emissions e:  
(2) ( )it it t ita BAU e= Ψ −  
Abatement has a cost defined by a firm’s abatement cost function or its derivative, the 
marginal abatement cost (MAC) function.  Probably the best-known result in permit market theory 
is that each firm chooses a level of abatement such that its MAC is equal to the permit price in 
every period, which implicitly defines the optimal amount of abatement:   
 * * 1( , , ( )) ( , , ( ))t it it t it t it it t t it tMAC a F BAU a MAC F BAUσ σ
−= Ψ ⇒ = Ψ , 
where tF  refers to a vector of variables that determines the MAC function.  To clear the market, 
aggregate abatement has to equal the difference between aggregate BAU emissions and the 
emissions cap S :  
(3) *
1 1 1 1
N N
ik ik
k i k i
a BAU S
τ τ
= = = =
= −∑∑ ∑∑  
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Because firms involved in the production of power and heat are dominant within the EU ETS, 
and because they may be able to abate emissions without either cutting output or building new 
plants (in contrast to the other sectors), I focus on emissions and abatement in this sector.  I assume 
that the predominant method of abatement is a shift in the generation dispatch order6
 
Gt
 away from 
hard coal towards gas, because the former is more than twice as emissions-intensive per unit of 
output than the latter.  Fuel switching is generally considered to be abatement method of choice in 
the EU ETS [4, 22, 23, 25], given that there was not enough time between market setup and the 
end of the first phase for firms to alter production technology significantly.   Because load factors 
for power generation are around 50%, a production shift from coal to gas is more likely in this than 
in other sectors covered by the market.  This means that in addition to BAU emissions, abatement 
costs in the EU ETS depend on gas and coal prices, which I will denominate with  and 
 
Ct , and 
on capacity for production shifts.   
Throughout this paper I assume that prices for gas and hard coal are exogenous to the 
allowance price.  Although this is technically incorrect as these prices are simultaneously 
determined on international markets, I think that the introduced bias should be small for the 
following reasons:  First, the EU satisfies 76 % of its natural gas and 68 % of its hard coal7 demand 
through imports, implying that European fuel markets are highly integrated into world markets.  
Second, demand by EU power & heat producers amounts to 5.9 % and 5.6 % of world supplies of 
natural gas and hard coal, respectively, implying that a marginal change in demand due to the EU 
ETS should not have a large effect on the world price.8  Third, gas prices are indexed to the world 
oil price, which is unlikely to be significantly influenced by the EU ETS.  And lastly, there appears 
to be no cointegration between fuel prices and the EUA price.   
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If aggregate abatement costs are continuous and quadratic in abatement over the range where 
fuel switching is feasible, the market’s abatement cost (AC) and marginal abatement cost (MAC) 
functions can be written as  
(4) 
( )2211 1 1
1 1 2
1 21 1
( , , )
2
* *
( , , )
N N N
t it t t t it iti i i
t t t
N N
t it t t t iti i
bAC a G C b a a
b G C
MAC a G C b b a
λ λ
= = =
= =
= +
≡ +
= +
∑ ∑ ∑
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The level of the MAC function is determined by coal and gas prices.  Because initial marginal 
abatement costs are nonzero and fuel switching occurs from coal to gas, it must be that 
1 10, 0tb λ> >  and 2 0λ < , whereas the slope 2 0b >  ensures increasing marginal abatement costs.  
This parameter captures generator technology across the dispatch order and potentially other (but 
unidentified) reasons for an increasing aggregate MAC. 9
(5) 
  In equilibrium, allowance demand must 
equal supply and the aggregate MAC has to equal the allowance price.  This allows me to solve for 
the optimal aggregate abatement as a function of the allowance price:  
( )11
1N
it t ti
t
a b
b
σ
=
= −∑  
Substituting (5) into (3) yields 
(6) ( )1
1 1 12
1 N
t t it
t t i
b BAU S
b
τ τ
σ
= = =
− = −∑ ∑∑  
I now take expectations at time t, subtract them from (6) and simplify: 
 [ ]( ) [ ]( ) [ ]( )1 1 2
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Entries for periods before t cancel out because their ex-post expectation is the same as their 
realization.  Substituting (1) and dividing by N gives 
               [ ]( ) [ ]( ) ( )2 21 1 1
1 1 1 1 1 1
1 1 * [ ]
N N
k t k k t k i k k k ik
k t k t k t i k t i
b bE b E b E
N N N N
τ τ τ τ
σ σ β ε−
= + = + = + = = + =
− = − + Ψ − Ψ +∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑ ∑  
Provided that the error is stationary, the last term’s mean and variance go to zero as N goes to 
infinity.  The intuition behind this is that uncorrelated, firm-specific shocks cancel each other out 
in a large market, i.e. only shocks that affect all firms simultaneously have an impact on BAU 
emissions (and thus on marginal abatement costs).  Setting 
1
1/ * N iiNβ β== ∑ , I can simplify to 
(7) [ ]( ) [ ]( ) ( )1 1 2 1
1 1 1
[ ]k t k k t k t t t
k t k t k t
E b E b b N E
τ τ τ
σ σ β −
= + = + = +
− = − + Ψ − Ψ∑ ∑ ∑  
If markets are efficient, prices incorporate changes in underlying fundamentals fully and 
immediately [26], implying that 
 
Et[Pt +1] = (1+ r)Pt ≡ ρPt , where 
 
r  is the interest rate and tP  refers 
to any price.  This only applies to prices, but not to stationary variables such as the weather.  For 
this reason I will partition the vector tΨ  into stationary determinants collected in 
S
tΨ  and 
nonstationary determinants such as prices in ntΨ .  For t τ<<  , equation (7) can be solved 
recursively to10
(8) 
  
( ) ( )11 1 1 1 2 2
[ ]S St t tn n n S
t t t t t t k
k t
E
b b b N b N τ τσ ρσ ρ β ρ β ρ
−
− − −
=
Ψ − Ψ
= + − + Ψ − Ψ +
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The allowance price is determined by the previous day’s price, changes in fuel prices and 
shocks to 
 
Ψt .  The summation term in the denominator of the RHS decreases through time and 
indicates that exogenous shocks to the stationary determinants of BAU emissions increasingly 
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affect the permit price.  Intuitively, such a shock should not influence the permit price much in the 
beginning of the market, as these determinants will return to their long-term mean and the shock is 
likely to be neutralized by a movement in the opposite direction later on.  As time progresses, this 
“evening out” diminishes and individual shocks become more important.11
The discount rate in equation (8) could be estimated directly using nonlinear tools.  However, 
the day-to-day discount rate is close to zero.  I therefore simplify to 
  This does not apply to 
nonstationary determinants of BAU emissions, for which the summation term cancels out just like 
it does for permit and fuel prices.   
(9) 
( )1
1 2 2
[ ]S St t tn n S
t t t k
k t
E
b b N b N τ τσ β β ρ
−
−
=
Ψ − Ψ
∆ = ∆ + ∆Ψ +
∑
 
where ∆ refers to the first -difference operator. To keep the estimation linear I use an annual 
discount rate of 10% to calculate the denominator on the RHS.12
I assume that consumer demand is inelastic in the short term.  Because demand must meet 
supply at all times in the electricity grid, 
 
 
Ψt  includes factors that determine either demand or 
supply of BAU emissions.  In the base specification, I include temperatures across Europe, 
reservoir level changes in the Nordic countries and precipitation in non-Nordic countries13 StΨ in ; 
and fuel prices and the FTSE Eurotop 100 (a tradable index representing the 100 most highly 
capitalized blue chip companies in Europe) in ntΨ .  The reasoning behind this choice is the 
following: Temperatures affect consumer demand through increased changes in heating (winter) or 
cooling (summer); reservoir levels and precipitation influence emissions on the supply side through 
the availability of renewable energy (assuming that all hydropower available is used because its 
marginal operating costs are below those of conventional generation [23]); fuel prices may 
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determine emissions even in the absence of abatement through a change in the dispatch order; and 
the FTSE Eurotop 100  is a proxy for overall economic performance in the EU.  I further introduce 
an ARCH(1) term in order to allow for a changing variance over time, which is standard procedure 
in the analysis of price series and a dummy indicating the first round of emissions verifications.  
This leads to the following specification:   
(10) 
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tT  and tP  refer to weighted average daily temperature and precipitation (outside Nordic 
countries) in the EU, respectively; tR  to Nordic reservoir levels; tF  to the FTSE; tW  ( tS ) is a 
winter (summer) dummy taking the value of 1 in November through March (June through 
September), and zero otherwise; and tD  is an emissions verification dummy equal to one on April 
25-28, and zero otherwise.14 0 8 0 1,..., , ,v vα α  All other variables are as defined above, and  are 
parameters to be estimated.   
In order to define shocks to reservoir levels and the weather, I need a measure of what their 
expected levels are.  For reservoir levels tR , I use weekly median levels 
med
tR  based on the years 
1991-2006.  Because reservoir levels are a stock variable, I compute the flow by taking differences 
of both actual and median levels, such that Res Res 1[ ] [ ]
med
t t t t t t tE R E R R R−Ψ − Ψ = ∆ − ∆ = ∆ − ∆ .   
For temperature and precipitation, I construct daily expectations using 30-y means, i.e. 
2004
1 1975
[ ] 1/ 30*t t dyyE X X− == ∑  for ,X T P= , where d  refers to the calendar day corresponding to 
day t and y  to years.  Because traders are likely to take weather forecasts into account and the 
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weather over the weekends should influence Monday trades, I calculate 5-day moving averages of 
temperature and precipitation minus their expectation centered on the current day: 
( )25 51 2[ ] [ ] / 5
td d
t t t t k kk t
X E X X X E X+− = −− ≡ = −∑ .   
 
4.  Extensions 
4.1  Introducing nonlinear terms 
I derived the base model using abatement costs that are linear in fuel prices and BAU 
determinants.  This is a useful benchmark, but it may well be that some of the relationships are 
nonlinear.  For example, increased rainfall may reduce BAU emissions quite strongly at first, but 
as the various reservoirs fill up, less of the additional precipitation can be captured, implying a 
diminishing marginal effect of rainfall on EU-wide BAU emissions.  Temperature on the other 
hand may exhibit increasing marginal effects because heat loss is a square function of the 
difference between inside and outside temperatures.  I will therefore introduce square terms of all 
variables.   
Furthermore, it is possible that interaction effects exist.  For example, an increase in BAU 
emissions (due either to a lack of rainfall or a cold spell in winter) coupled with an increase in gas 
prices may increase marginal abatement costs by more than the sum of the two isolated effects.  
Thus, I will include interaction terms between fuel prices and other BAU determinants.15
4.2  Introducing dynamic expectations of fundamental prices 
   
Thus far I have assumed that EUA and fuel prices have the Markov property such that 
expectations about future prices are a function only of today’s price but not of the preceding price 
path, and that spot and futures prices are equal except for a possible difference caused by storage 
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costs [27].  The Markov property is the centerpiece of asset pricing for stocks and derivatives and 
implies that there are no arbitrage opportunities for chartist traders.   
In reality, spot and futures prices can be quite different.  Whatever the reason (asymmetric 
information, risk aversion, fixed contracts or bounded rationality), it is possible that traders form 
their expectations about prices for EUA fundamentals not only based on today’s prices, but also on 
past prices and/or a combination of spot and futures prices.   
It is impossible to know a priori what prices and/or time lags best model traders’ expectations.  
I therefore estimate the model for a set of candidate specifications and choose the one with the best 
fit as measured by the sum of AIC and BIC.16  Specifically, I will combine up to three different gas 
prices17 (spot, month-ahead and year-ahead futures) with appropriate square and interaction terms 
(for which I use only one gas price type per specification) and up to two price lags.  Unfortunately, 
there are not several interchangeable measures for coal prices.  The coal index for North-Western 
Europe (see data section below) seems by far the best available price information for hard coal.  
This procedure results in a total of 36 different candidate specifications.18
4.3  Introducing lagged EUA price changes 
   
Although the variance in the base specification and Extensions 1 and 2 is allowed to vary over 
time due to the ARCH(1) term, the error itself is assumed to be uncorrelated over time.  In order to 
reduce autocorrelation, most time series analyses include either lagged prices or AR terms in the 
error from the outset.  There is no problem with this approach if the main goal is price forecasting, 
but what is the meaning of a lagged dependent variable in a structural equation that seeks to define 
price determinants?  This question is routinely ignored, but in the current context this would be 
inappropriate.   
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If the introduction of lagged dependent variables merely improves the model fit but does not 
qualitatively affect the explanatory power of the exogenous determinants (a change in the point 
estimates of the coefficients has to be expected with the introduction of a new significant variable 
into the model), then one can argue that they merely proxy for some form of inertia or an omitted 
variable that exhibits autocorrelation.  However, if they take over as the major source of 
explanatory power, then this indicates that something in the model is amiss.   
 
5.  Results 
5.1  Data 
For my regressions and tests I use the following data:  
EUA prices: Daily series of over-the-counter (OTC) prices, Point Carbon.19
Gas prices: ICE month-ahead futures and Zeebrugge day-ahead prices for UK natural gas 
(“spot”), and TTF year-ahead contracts for natural gas in continental Europe.   
   
Coal prices: McCloskey coal marker for North-Western Europe, which incorporates 
information on all trades involving hard coal that enters Europe from abroad within the next three 
months.  It is an average of actual transactions or, in their absence, an assessment of fair value by 
traders.  This marker is published weekly and generally viewed as the most comprehensive 
available price information for hard coal.   
Temperature and precipitation: From the European Climate Assessment & Dataset20, which 
contains daily entries from a large number of monitoring locations across Europe.  I weighted 
temperature deviations by population around each monitoring location and precipitation by 
installed hydroelectric capacity.   
19 
Nordic reservoir levels: Weekly reservoir levels (in Terawatt-hours) and median levels based 
on 1991-2006 taken from the Nordpool exchange. The Nordpool market (composed of Norway, 
Sweden, Denmark and Finland) is an important hydropower-producing region in Europe.   
5.2  Estimation results 
Visual inspection of the price graph as well as previous analyses [1, 4] indicate that the 
relationship between market fundamentals and the allowance price likely changed after the first 
emissions verification.  I therefore estimate equation (10) separately for the time between January 
2005 and June 2007 (“full period”; in July 2007, prices decreased to practically zero and remained 
at that level until the end of the market, which makes an inclusion of the last six months pointless), 
as well as for the period before the price crash induced by the first round of emissions verifications 
in April 2006 (“pre-crash”) and after (“post-crash”).   
Table 2 presents the results from the base regression.  Gas prices are positive and significant 
for all periods, and precipitation is significant in the post-crash period.  The crash dummy and the 
ARCH term are highly significant, but none of the other variables is correlated with EUA price 
changes.  Because the FTSE is not significant in any specification and its presence (including the 
square and interaction terms) leads to multicollinearity in the extension specifications, I re-
estimated all models without it.21
Along with the AIC and BIC I also compute the Cox-Snell generalized R2 as a more intuitive 
measure of model fit, defined by 
   
2 2/ˆ1 [ (0) / ( )] nR L L θ= − , where ˆ( )L θ  and (0)L  refer to the 
likelihood of the full model and of a model that contains only an intercept and an ARCH(1) term, 
respectively, and n is the number of observations.  The generalized R2 can be interpreted as the 
percentage of the variation of the dependent variable explained by the model, relative to the 
variation left unexplained by the null model [28].  The full model including the verification dummy 
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accounts for about 15 % of this variation, whereas for the pre- and post-crash periods, the model 
explains 6 %  and 17%, respectively.  The standardized residuals defined by * /t t tε ε σ=  exhibit 
strong serial correlation in all periods, as evidenced by the Ljung-Box Q(k) statistic, with the 
number of lags k chosen as the largest integer for which [2 ]k N≤ .   
The coefficient estimates are significantly different before and after the price crash based on 
an LR test, confirming the suspected structural break.  I therefore restrict estimation of the 
remaining regressions to the two sub-periods.  The first panel of Table 3 contains the results from 
extension 4.1.  The introduction of the 14 nonlinear terms leads to an increase in the R2 by 
construction, as the model likelihood is nondecreasing in the number of included regressors.  Also, 
the coefficients on Nordic reservoir levels, their squares, and their interaction with coal prices are 
significant and have the expected sign.  However, the increase of both AIC and BIC for the pre-
crash model relative to the base specification implies that the model did not qualitatively improve 
by including these extra terms, and serial correlation of the standardized residuals persists.  This is 
confirmed by a likelihood ratio test of extension 4.1 against the (nested) base model, which reveals 
that the added terms are jointly insignificant.  In contrast, both AIC and BIC decrease for the post-
crash period, the LR test is highly significant, and the standardized residuals are not serially 
correlated, indicating a clear improvement due to the introduction of the nonlinear terms.  For this 
period, the extended model explains 48% of the variation in price changes that is not accounted for 
by the ARCH(1) null model, and many of the additional explanatory variables are significant and 
have the correct sign.   
Results from the “winners” of the 36 candidate specifications for extension 4.2 are shown in 
the central panel of Table 3.  For the pre-crash period, a specification including twice-lagged 
month-ahead and year-ahead futures (with squares and interaction terms computed with the latter) 
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exhibits the best model fit and decreased serial correlation.  The LR test indicates that the 
additional terms (relative to extension 1) are jointly significant.  The AIC is now smaller than in 
the base specification, but the BIC is still higher (note that the AIC does not punish parsimony as 
much as the BIC, and extension 4.2 contains 23 more parameters than the base specification).  The 
coefficients related to Nordic reservoir levels are still significant, as well as three of the gas price 
coefficients (two positive, one negative).   
In contrast, the model fit improves significantly and unambiguously for the post-crash period, 
where the best specification involves the use of spot, month-ahead, and year-ahead gas prices and 
two price lags (interaction terms computed with year-ahead futures).  The model now accounts for 
60% of the price change variation unaccounted for by the null model.  Both AIC and BIC have 
further improved (i.e. decreased) relative to the base specification and extension 4.1, and the 
standardized residuals are not serially correlated.  The interpretation of the individual coefficients 
on gas prices in the simultaneous presence of three different gas price “flavors” and two time lags 
is not straightforward, but in aggregate an increase in gas (coal) prices increases (decreases) the 
allowance price as expected.  Most of the other determinants are meaningfully and significantly 
associated with EUA prices, and both precipitation and Nordic reservoir level exhibit negative and 
diminishing effects consistent with the underlying theory.   
The rightmost panel in Table 3 presents the results from extension 4.3.  Introducing three lags 
of allowance price changes is effective in explaining current price changes in the pre-crash period 
as evidenced by the decreased BIC and AIC, increased R2 and significant LR test, and in removing 
serial correlation.  However, most of the coefficients on the fundamentals remain insignificant, 
indicating that the true price drivers have not been identified.  After the crash, introducing one 
lagged dependent variable decreases both AIC and BIC and further improves the explanatory 
power of the model, although the increase of the R2 is rather small.  Most of the exogenous 
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determinants related to EUA prices in extension 4.2 remain significant, with the exception of coal 
prices and summer temperatures.   
 
6.  Discussion 
Taken together, the results shown in Tables 2-3 imply the following:    
a.)  There was a structural break in allowance price determination after the price adjustment 
due to the emissions verifications in April 2006.  Whereas the market fundamentals identified in 
this paper explain a significant portion of the variation in EUA price changes in the post-crash 
period, this is not the case before the price crash except for gas prices and Nordic reservoir levels.   
b.)  Coefficients on fuel prices, temperature and availability of hydroelectric power are 
statistically significant and have the expected sign for the period after the price adjustment.  This is 
consistent with results obtained by [1] and [4].   
c.)  In the post-crash period, market fundamentals drive the allowance price in a nonlinear way.  
The introduction of squared and interaction terms significantly improves the model.  This is not the 
case before the crash.   
d.)  Allowance prices appear to violate the Markov property.  Market fundamentals are not 
immediately internalized, as a combination of spot and futures prices and lagged prices 
significantly improve the model (extensions 4.2 versus 4.1).  This could be due to some form of 
market learning on behalf of market participants and implies that arbitrage opportunities existed.   
e.)  Introduction of lagged EUA price changes only marginally improves the model for the 
post-crash period, but significantly so before the crash.  Although gas prices and Nordic reservoir 
levels contribute to the explanatory power in extension 4.3, the most important “determinants” of 
EUA price changes are lagged price changes.   
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I chose the market fundamentals in this analysis based on the premise of equality between 
allowance price and marginal abatement costs.  Assuming that my market model is correct and that 
I did not exclude a crucial price driver that is linked to aggregate abatement and exhibits severe 
autocorrelation, my results imply that marginal abatement costs were most likely not equal to the 
permit price during the first 16 months of the market.  Since this equality is a necessary condition 
for a permit market to achieve a given emissions reduction at least cost, the market was not 
efficient during that period.  After the first round of emissions verifications, the market appears to 
have largely corrected itself in the sense that the EUA price reacted more consistently to 
fundamentals.   
Because of the eventual correction, the question as to what caused the allowance price to 
deviate from marginal abatement costs may be moot for the EU ETS itself.  However, the price 
stayed too high for a long period and was passed on to consumers, with likely negative effects on 
overall welfare and firms’ abatement choices.  It is therefore in the interest of future markets to 
avoid a similar situation.   
In order to identify policy recommendations that would allow future markets to attain 
efficiency faster than the EU ETS, it is necessary to know the reason why the allowance price was 
initially not determined by marginal abatement costs.  In the next subsection I propose four 
different (but not mutually exclusive) hypotheses, along with a selection of policy instruments that 
could be used to address them.   
6.1  A CO2 Bubble?  
In a bubble, the price is disconnected from fundamentals and driven by self-fulfilling 
expectations, which would be consistent with the above results.  In a discrete-time setting with 
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fully informed and rational agents, a bubble cannot exist on theoretical grounds [29, 30], but 
introduction of continuous time (thus neutralizing the backward induction argument) or allowing 
for incomplete information and/or some sort of bounded rationality on behalf of traders renders a 
bubble possible [31, 32, 33].  Bubbles and “herding” behavior have been shown to exist and persist 
in experiments even with experienced subjects [34, 35].   
Anything that temporarily increases the price above its fundamental value could lead to self-
fulfilling expectations of further increases.  In the EU ETS, this initial price increase could have 
been caused by an (overly) bullish market report, price manipulation by dominant market players 
or any fundamental-based price increase that was not recognized as such by some traders who then 
expected future increases even when the underlying reason for the price increase vanished.   
Unfortunately, it is impossible to conclusively prove the existence of a bubble, because there 
is always an alternate hypothesis of a misspecified market model [36].  Gurkaynak [37] provides a 
survey of bubble tests, among which cointegration and regime-switching tests appear to be most 
promising in the permit market context.  Cointegration tests are based on the assertion that in an 
exponentially growing bubble, a cointegrating vector cannot exist that renders a linear combination 
of integrated dependent and independent variables stationary, as this would in effect prove a 
systematic relationship between price and fundamentals [30, 38, 39].  I tested for cointegration 
between EUA prices, fuel prices, Nordic reservoir levels and the FTSE (all of which are integrated 
of order 1 based on unit root tests) and found none.  This is consistent with the presence of a 
bubble, but of course lack of cointegration could also be caused by other reasons.   
Regime-switching bubble tests rely on the premise that price changes are governed by 
different distributions in a bubble’s boom and bust phases, and that the state in one period is 
influenced by last period’s state.  Such tests in principle allow for detection of stochastically 
crashing bubbles that are difficult to detect otherwise [40, 41, 42, 43].  I carried out a regime-
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switching test as outlined by [44] and proxied the bubble term with lagged allowance price levels.  
The bubble test consists of testing whether a) the coefficients of the bubble term are as expected 
(i.e. positive during boom and negative during bust), and b) the state probability depends on the 
state in the previous period.  In both cases I was not able to reject the null hypothesis of no bubble 
in the pre-crash period, but the power of the test may be weak.22
Strategies to avoid bubbles in future markets include more frequent emission verifications, 
especially in the beginning of the market, and the possibility of short selling of allowances.  To the 
extent that they improve information about marginal abatement costs, permit auctions could also 
reduce the potential for a speculative permit price bubble.   
   
6.2  Market power 
It is possible that the allowance price was not set by the interaction of price takers in an 
efficient market, but that dominant players set the price so as to maximize their own profits.  This 
could decouple the allowance price from the fundamentals considered here if dominant firms’ 
ability to influence the price changes over time.  Of all market participants in the EU ETS, large 
power producers exhibit the greatest potential for market power, and, as it happens, they also 
reaped large profits from the initially high EUA price due to a combination of free allocation and 
cost pass-through [8, 9, 45, 46, 47].  Power and heat producers were net demanders of allowances 
and therefore Hahn’s [48] prescription about market power in permit markets indicates that they 
would have used any market power to depress the price rather than inflate it.  However, [49] 
proves that when taking the interaction between output and permit market into account, even net 
permit demanders can find it profitable to inflate the permit price, provided that their free 
allowance allocation exceeds a specific threshold that is a function of cost throughput and firms’ 
relative emission intensities.  Market data from the UK and Germany indicate that power producers 
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indeed received an allocation in excess of this threshold.  Whether firms in the EU ETS actually 
exerted market power is a question that cannot be answered before trading data are made available, 
which is five years after the fact.  An obvious solution to fix or alleviate price inflation due to 
market power is to reduce the amount of free allocation to firms, although full efficiency cannot be 
achieved by means of allocation alone.   
6.3  Firms hedging against stochastic emissions 
If firms were unable to effectively control their emissions in time for phase 1, either because 
abatement was simply not feasible in the short-run because firms were locked into long-term 
contracts, or because emissions are a function of stochastic output, then firms have to hedge 
against the probability of having to pay a penalty.  Each additional allowance relieves them from 
the obligation to pay a penalty if the cap turns out to be binding, but becomes an unnecessary 
expense otherwise.  This means that at the end of the market, an allowance is either worth the 
penalty for noncompliance or zero.  If firms view emissions as stochastic, the allowance price is 
not related to any form of abatement costs but to the discounted penalty of noncompliance 
multiplied by the probability of a binding cap [6].  [50] develops and estimates such a model and 
finds that it fits the data quite well.  There is little that can be done to counter firms’ inability to 
control emissions, other than possibly increasing the period between legal inception and the start of 
the market.   
6.4  Allocation updating 
Although EU member countries based free allocation for phase 1 on historic emissions and/or 
projections and the European Commission strongly suggested that only historic emissions be used 
when deciding on allocations for later phases, most EU countries based their National Allocation 
Plans for phase 2 on verified emissions from 2005.  Such allocation “updating” results in a 
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disincentive to abate, and [51, 52] formally show that the permit price will be greater in this case 
than if allocations were fixed based on historic emissions.   
If allocation rules were the same in all countries, allocation updating would simply lead to a 
(constant) wedge between marginal abatement costs and the allowance price.  But because each 
EU member state defines its own allocation rules, the “penalty” for abating in the form of a 
decreased future free allocation differs across countries, possibly canceling the effect of the 
fundamentals.  However, empirically testing whether allocation updating was partly responsible for 
the apparent deviation between marginal abatement costs and allowance price in the beginning of 
the market would require knowledge of abatement cost functions by country, which is not readily 
available.  Allocation updating can and should be avoided (either by one-off grandfathering or 
auctioning) because it is clearly not incentive-compatible.   
 
7.  Conclusions 
In the first phase of the EU ETS, the allowance price exhibited high volatility and followed a 
peculiar path.  The crash in April 2006 was most likely caused by an adjustment of expectations 
about aggregate emissions, but it is not obvious what drove the price that high in the first place.  In 
this paper I examine if and to what extent the allowance price was determined by market 
fundamentals related to aggregate marginal abatement costs.   
I derive a market model that expresses allowance price changes as a function of fuel prices, 
temperatures, the availability of hydroelectric power and stock market indices, and find that it fits 
the data reasonably well after the first round of emissions verifications, but not before.  The most 
important allowance price determinants after the crash are fuel prices, summer temperatures and 
precipitation, which appear to influence the allowance price in a nonlinear way.  There is some 
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evidence that the allowance price did not immediately incorporate new market information, which 
may be a sign of learning on behalf of traders in a new market.   
The model does not work nearly so well for the period before the first round of emissions 
verifications, and the variables that explain the overwhelming part of the pre-crash price variation 
are lagged allowance price changes.   
Equality of allowance price and marginal abatement costs is a necessary condition for every 
permit market to achieve its main goal, which is to attain a given emissions reduction at least cost.  
My results imply that this equality most likely did not hold before the price crash and that therefore 
the market was initially inefficient.  This is the main finding of this paper.  One could argue that 
the crucial thing is that the market eventually corrected itself, but it is important to note that the 
correction did not take place until 16 months after the start, and that during this time the apparently 
inflated allowance price was passed on to consumers via higher electricity and other prices.   
In order for future markets to avoid the same start-up problems, it is necessary to identify the 
true allowance price drivers in the beginning of the market.  Although a conclusive answer to this 
question exceeds the scope of this paper, I propose four alternative explanations:  1) An allowance 
price bubble, 2) market power on behalf of power and heat companies, 3) firms hedging against 
stochastic emissions and 4) allocation “updating” by EU countries when defining National 
Allocation Plans for phase 2.  All four explanations are possible on theoretical grounds and 
consistent with initial price inflation, and there is some empirical evidence for (potential) price 
manipulation and emissions hedging by firms, whereas the evidence for a CO2 bubble is 
inconclusive.  More research is needed to identify the root of the initial market inefficiency in 
order to prevent future markets from suffering the same experience.   
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Summary results for Phase I of the EU ETS 
  2005 2006 2007 Total Phase I 
     
Price (time average) € 18.40 € 18.05 € 0.72 € 12.39 
Trading volumea 262 Mt 817 Mt 1,364 Mt 2,443 Mt 
Trading valuea € 5.4 billion € 14.6 billion € 28.0 billion € 48.0 billion 
Allocation 2,099 Mt 2,072 Mt 2,079 Mt 6,250 Mt 
Emissions 2,010 Mt 2,031 Mt 2,041 Mt 6,081 Mt 
Surplus (volume) 89 Mt 41 Mt 39 Mt 168 Mt 
Surplus (%) 4.22 % 1.98 % 1.85 % 2.69 % 
  a: Based on OTC and exchange trading for Phase I and II, but excluding bilateral trades 
 
Table 2: Results from base estimation (Equation 10); dependent variable: Daily EUA price changes 
  full period pre-crash post-crash 
    
Gas1Y 0.4117** 0.5301** 0.3156** 
   p (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
Coal 0.0238 0.0520 0.0125 
   p (0.371) (0.261) (0.504) 
Temp W -4.0883 -4.4527 -4.4215 
   p (0.487) (0.829) (0.080) 
Temp S 8.6996 18.6700 2.9514 
   p (0.367) (0.474) (0.573) 
Prec -0.6414 -1.9232 -1.0388* 
   p (0.410) (0.494) (0.034) 
Nordlev 1.3395 17.8560 1.3654 
   p (0.925) (0.707) (0.835) 
Crash -4.1734**   
   p (<0.001)   
L.ARCH 0.8911** 0.4908** 2.2889** 
   p (<0.001) (<0.001) (<0.001) 
N 563 298 261 
AIC 798.47 473.51 259.74 
BIC 837.47 503.09 288.26 
Rsqa 0.1522 0.0574 0.1696 
LR test (struct. break) 21.8600   
   p (<0.001)   
Q(k)b 74.82 49.86 44.48 
   p (0.006) (0.039) (0.070) 
   *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; a: Rsq=1-[L(0)/L(b)]^(2/N)  
   b: Ljung-Box Q statistic with k=floor[2*sqrt(N)]  
 
 
 Table 3: Results from estimating extensions 1-3; dependent variable: Daily EUA price changes 
Dep. variable: Extension 1 Extension 2 Extension 3 
D.EUA Pre-crash Post-crash Pre-crash Post-crash Pre-crash Post-crash 
 Coeff (p-value) Coeff (p-value) Coeff (p-value) Coeff (p-value) Coeff (p-value) Coeff (p-value) 
L.D.EUA             0.1730** (0.009) 0.0892** (<0.001) 
L2.D.EUA             -0.0636 (0.174)   
L3.D.EUA             -0.1375** (<0.001)   
D.Gas1Y 0.9118 (0.766) -0.1416 (0.598) 0.7826 (0.749) 0.2757 (0.261) -0.6813 (0.768) 0.1166 (0.610) 
L.D.Gas1Y       -0.2557** (0.008) 0.05879* (0.042) -0.1469 (0.092) 0.0673* (0.016) 
L2.D.Gas1Y       -0.09007 (0.363) -0.04392 (0.068) 0.0946 (0.281) -0.0576** (0.001) 
D.Gas1M       0.06160** (<0.001) 0.02638** (0.007) 0.0812** (<0.001) 0.0360** (<0.001) 
L.D.Gas1M       0.03189** (0.001) -0.03058* (0.011) 0.0256* (0.017) -0.0377** (<0.001) 
L2.D.Gas1M       0.00656 (0.709) 0.003766 (0.758) 0.0169 (0.205) 0.0037 (0.743) 
D.GasS          -0.03237** (<0.001)   -0.0223** (<0.001) 
L.D.GasS          0.0037 (0.559)   0.0074 (0.250) 
L2.D.GasS          0.02333** (<0.001)   0.0274** (<0.001) 
D.Coal 0.4465 (0.474) -0.0549 (0.806) 0.6587 (0.215) -0.4829* (0.013) 0.6154 (0.180) -0.3475 (0.124) 
L.D.Coal       -0.04671 (0.282) 0.03694** (<0.001) -0.0290 (0.482) 0.0015 (0.878) 
L2.D.Coal       0.05813 (0.230) 0.03999** (<0.001) -0.0274 (0.498) 0.0.294** (0.008) 
Temp W 2053.0 (0.229) -80.352 (0.501) 582.69 (0.674) -52.791 (0.581) -1508.1 (0.137) -141.46 (0.085) 
Temp S -1186.2 (0.323) 1690.9** (0.004) -789.95 (0.402) 1631.2** (0.004) -406.25 (0.603) 688.03 (0.298) 
Prec 5.8174 (0.873) 17.246* (0.016) 11.966 (0.670) -32.878** (<0.001) 3.8256 (0.869) -35.981** (<0.001) 
Nordlev -1985.6* (0.041) -0.0627 (0.999) -2426.9** (0.001) -113.09 (0.111) -2130.2** (<0.001) 11.394 (0.840) 
D.Gas1Y^2*10-6 -13.281 (0.843) 31.376** (<0.001) -4.3317 (0.935) 6.8126 (0.415) 21.432 (0.684) 17.803 (0.057) 
D.Coal^2*10-6 -1.1670 (0.883) 0.7066 (0.858) -3.1531 (0.584) 9.1898* (0.012) -3.6093 (0.499) 7.2773 (0.074) 
TempW^2 -3.6086 (0.238) 0.1388 (0.515) -0.9074 (0.715) 0.08912 (0.602) 2.7722 (0.127) 0.2556 (0.084) 
TempS^2 2.1531 (0.306) -2.8844** (0.004) 1.4725 (0.373) -2.7848** (0.004) 0.7327 (0.596) -1.1700 (0.304) 
Prec^2 -0.0252 (0.813) 0.0163 (0.231) 0.01039 (0.904) 0.04175** (<0.001) -0.0014 (0.983) 0.0738** (<0.001) 
Nordlev^2 2.5134* (0.016) 0.1059 (0.452) 3.1082** (0.001) 0.3345** (0.002) 2.7242** (<0.001) 0.4507** (<0.001) 
D.Gas1Y*TempW -0.1740 (0.924) -0.0706 (0.737) -1.1843 (0.489) -0.2838 (0.096) 0.0720 (0.959) -0.2638 (0.078) 
D.Gas1Y*TempS 1.9609 (0.294) 0.1494 (0.499) 1.2579 (0.511) 0.325 (0.228) 2.0041 (0.205) 0.0301 (0.916) 
D.Gas1Y*Prec -0.3496 (0.670) -0.4944** (<0.001) -0.6327 (0.353) -0.3057** (<0.001) -1.1454* (0.034) -0.3896** (<0.001) 
D.Gas1Y*Nordlev -8.1324 (0.511) -3.2232** (0.002) -12.749 (0.222) -2.4166* (0.043) -11.174 (0.199) -3.7326** (<0.001) 
D.Coal*TempW -0.6294 (0.526) 0.0584 (0.594) -0.9602 (0.245) 0.16 (0.053) -0.7725 (0.221) 0.0781 (0.464) 
D.Coal*TempS -1.1025 (0.476) -0.1636 (0.115) -1.1786 (0.298) -0.2494** (0.004) -0.5487 (0.550) -0.3218** (0.004) 
D.Coal*Prec 0.0417 (0.949) -0.1278 (0.310) -0.001281 (0.998) 0.7407** (<0.001) 0.4522 (0.280) 0.8385** (<0.001) 
D.Coal*Nordlev 37.139* (0.017) 1.1904 (0.164) 46.317** (<0.001) 2.6239* (0.021) 40.688** (<0.001) 0.5430 (0.581) 
L.ARCH 0.7674** (<0.001) 3.3200** (<0.001) 1.1649** (<0.001) 2.9419** (<0.001) 1.2742** (<0.001) 2.8012** (<0.001) 
N 298 261 285 246 283 245 
AIC 485.10 169.06 456.45 124.09 403.35 117.14 
BIC 573.83 254.61 569.68 243.27 527.3 239.68 
Rsqa 0.1198 0.4810 0.2071 0.5979 0.3480 0.6112 
LR vs. prev. spec. 20.41 (0.202) 122.68 (<0.001) 29.08 (<0.001) 72.27 (<0.001) 56.27 (<0.001) 11.71 (<0.001) 
Q(k)b 57.85 (0.007) 28.11 (0.664) 45.12 (0.078) 32.16 (0.409) 37.11 (0.285) 37.12 (0.208) 
   *: p<0.05; **: p<0.01; a: Rsq=1-[L(0)/L(b)]^(2/N); b: Ljung-Box Q statistic with k=floor[2*sqrt(N)]     
 Notes 
                                                          
1 The activity codes are defined as follows: 1: Combustion installations with a rated thermal 
input exceeding 20 MW; 2: Mineral oil refineries; 3: Coke ovens; 4: Metal ore (including sulfide 
ore) roasting or sintering installations; 5: Production of pig iron or steel (primary or secondary 
fusion) including continuous casting; 6: Production of cement clinker in rotary kilns or lime in 
rotary kilns or in other furnaces; 7: Manufacture of glass including glass fibre; 8: Manufacture of 
ceramic products by firing, in particular roofing tiles, bricks, refractory bricks, tiles, stoneware or 
porcelain; 9: Industrial plants for the production of (a) pulp from timber or other fibrous materials 
(b) paper and board; 10: Installations from other industries that opted into the system.   
2 Defined by activity code 1.  Besides power & heat producers that sell their output on the 
market (“main activity producers”) this activity code also includes installations involved in the 
production of on-site power and heat (“autoproducers”).  In 2005, main activity producers 
accounted for 93% of emissions from this sector (IEA data).   
3 In a simulation-based analysis of the EU ETS, Reilly and Paltsev [12] calculated market-
clearing marginal abatement costs to be € 0.6-0.9 for their base scenario, with prices in even the 
most extreme scenarios below €7. Medium price estimates by brokers were somewhat higher, of 
around €5.00 for the first phase [11].   
4 Emissions verification numbers were planned to be announced in May, but in late April 
reports were leaked that Belgium, France, the Czech Republic, the Netherlands and Estonia all had 
allowance surpluses, and the allowance shortage in Spain was much smaller than anticipated. By 
early May, the market was found to be 63.6 Mt long, with 21 countries reporting.  The 
announcement of the Polish surplus of another 26 Mt in September 2006 did not affect prices much.   
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5 The explanation given for including oil prices is not clear.  They cite a study by Christiansen 
et al. [23] which looked at general determinants for greenhouse gas markets but is not specific to 
fuel switching in the EU’s power sector.  Little power is generated using oil in Europe, so a switch 
from oil to gas is not likely to be the marginal abatement activity.   
6 The dispatch order is the sequence by which generators are brought online and is usually 
based on least cost.   
7 For lignite, the situation would be different, since this type of coal is typically mined right 
next to the power plant (i.e. the power plant is built right next to the mine).  However, I assume 
that lignite plants are not involved in production shifts for abatement purposes, because their 
operating costs are low.   
8 Data from International Energy Agency (IEA), energy statistics for OECD and non-OECD 
countries, 2008.  
9 Abatement consists of shifting production from the least efficient running coal generator to 
the most efficient gas generator that has free capacity.  The more production is shifted from coal 
and gas, the greater will be the efficiency of the marginal coal generator and the lower the 
efficiency of the first extramarginal gas generator, such that the amount of abatement per unit of 
production shift decreases while at the same time the cost of the shift increases.   
10 The derivation contained in an Appendix that is available at JEEM’s online archive of 
supplementary material, which can be accessed at 
http://www.econ.iastate.edu/jeem/supplement.htm.   
11 This means that in theory, fluctuations in the allowance price should increase towards the 
end of the market.  In practice, there is also an opposite effect: New markets typically show more 
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volatility than mature ones because market participants learn. The ARCH term (see below) allows 
a changing variance in either direction.   
12 The choice of discount rate is more important for the right hand side because small changes 
can cause significant differences in the numerical value for the summation term.  However, using 
discount rates of 5% and 20% did not significantly change the results.  
13  Installed hydroelectric capacity in the Nordic market (Norway, Sweden, Denmark and 
Finland) is 48 GW, compared to 25 GW in France, 21 GW each in Italy and Spain and 12 MW in 
Austria, to name the largest hydropower producers.  Because no readily available data exist  on 
aggregate European reservoir levels outside of the Nordic market, I include precipitation to 
complement Nordic reservoir levels.   
14 This dummy is added outside the model in order to prevent the price adjustment caused by 
the first round of emissions verifications to contaminate the impact of the continuous fundamental 
variables.  Although in theory such a price jump should not have happened because the allowance 
price supposedly incorporates all information about aggregate emissions and abatement, it seems 
clear that the price adjustment was not driven by any fundamentals related to abatement.   
15 The derivation of the econometric specification is eq. (A8) contained in the online Appendix 
(see note 10).   
16 AIC: Akaike Information Criterion; AIC=2k-2*ln(L); BIC=Bayesian Information Criterion; 
BIC= k*ln(n)-2*ln(L).  Both trade off model fit and parsimony, with BIC putting relatively more 
weight on the latter.  The lower AIC and BIC, the better the model fit.  I chose to use the sum of 
AIC and BIC because neither is superior to the other on theoretical grounds, but some models had 
almost identical BIC but different AIC values.   
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17 Unfortunately, there are not several useful measures for coal prices.  The coal index for 
North-Western Europe seems by far the best available price information for hard coal.   
18 Per lag structure: Three specifications with one gas price type; six specifications with two 
gas price types (two specifications for each of the three possible pairings, with squares interaction 
terms computed with one included gas price type); and three specifications with all three gas price 
types.  I do this for zero, one, and two price lags.   
19 Available at www.pointcarbon.com.   
20 Klein Tank et al., “Daily Dataset of 20th-century surface air temperature and precipitation 
series for the European Climate Assessment”, 2007, available at http://eca.knmi.nl.   
21  I also employed specifications with the German index DAX, but the results were 
qualitatively the same.  Daily stock market indices appear not to be related to allowance prices.   
22 Full results of the regime-switching tests are available from the author upon request.   
